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INTRODUCTION
This Essay encapsulates and expands on my comments at the February
2011 Symposium "Sovereignty in Today's World" organized by the
Michigan State International Law Review.
As explored by my fellow speakers, economic globalization is
challenging for the large economies of the world. It is even more
challenging for the smaller economies of the world, such as those in the
Caribbean. I will discuss some illustrative challenges to economic
sovereignty, how the Caribbean has responded to these challenges-what
have been the effects-and offer some analysis of the implications to the
economic sovereignty of Caribbean states and territories.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. The Author
is grateful to the editors of the International Law Review of the Michigan State University
College of Law for the opportunity to participate in its 2011 symposium, Sovereignty in
Today's World. Research work by Steve Jorgenson, JD expected 2012, Indiana University
School of Law-Indianapolis (expected 2011) provided valuable contributions to this
project. Ruth Lilly Law Library Research Librarian Debra Denslaw and the reference staff of
the Ruth Lilly Law Library were an invaluable resource.
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My remarks will explore the following subjects:
1. The meaning of sovereignty in the context of small
and micro states in the current iteration of
globalization
2. Economic globalization presents strong challenges
to the economic sovereignty of Caribbean states
and territories.
3. The challenges, and their impact on the Caribbean,
offer a narrative perspective and an analytical path
that is relevant to larger states and economies.
My remarks are organized as follow: Part I offers a working definition of
economic sovereignty; Part II consists of an illustrative list of challenges to
Caribbean economic sovereignty, and descriptions of Caribbean states' and
territories' responses to those challenges; Part IIl provides an analysis of
implications for Caribbean economic sovereignty and contemporary
economic sovereignty of states in general; and my concluding statements
are in Part IV.
I. WHAT IS ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY?
As so well articulated by Professor Dunoff earlier in the symposium,
there is a great deal of discussion and debate regarding the definition and
implications of sovereignty, and I am not going to create a new definition:
The working definition that I have used for my remarks is: The power of an
individual state to act independently-to choose and craft economic tools to
serve the best interests of the state's domestic economy (as such interests
are perceived by and/or pursuant to the vision and judgment of the people
and government of that state).
I also thought that it would be meaningful to specify what I mean when I
refer to "the Caribbean." Some potential for ambiguity is present since the
Caribbean Sea is bordered by several countries located in mainland North,
South, and Central America, including Mexico, Venezuela, and the United
States. In my remarks I am referring to islands that are both independent
states and overseas dependent territories in the Caribbean Basin.' The nation
states include Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, and the Dominican Republic.
The overseas dependent territories include entities affiliated with the United
Kingdom (for example, the British Virgin Islands, Anguilla, the Turks and
Caicos Islands, and the Cayman Islands); France (Martinique, Guadeloupe,
and St. Barthelemy); The Netherlands (St. Eustatius and Saba); and the
United States (Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
1. See, e.g., Peter Clegg, Governing the UK Caribbean Overseas Territories: A
Two-Way Perspective, in GOVERNANCE IN THE NON-INDEPENDENT CARIBBEAN: CHALLENGES
AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Peter Clegg & Emilio Pantojas-Garcia
eds., 2009).
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Like other island chains colonized by European powers (the island
chains of the Pacific offer another such example), the Caribbean provides a
wonderful experimental and experiential laboratory of the different types or
models of sovereignty and quasi-sovereignty extant in the contemporary
world. Looking at a map of the Caribbean, one might see a depiction of the
history of the New World as it was discovered and colonized by European
powers. It is due to that history that, today, the Caribbean has these varied
languages. For example, the United Kingdom has the British Virgin Islands,
Montserrat, and Anguilla.2 You also see French departements: That is, when
you step on the shores of Martinique and Guadalupe, you are in France. The
same is true in St. Barts because, according to the French conception of
France, the departements are essential parts of France-they're all French.
In another example, St. Maarten recently attained the status of an
independent country within the Kingdom of The Netherlands; and Anguilla,
the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the British Virgin Islands are overseas
dependent territories of the United Kingdom, with particular levels of
independence and autonomy. Then we have the Dutch Islands: St. Maartens,
St. Eustasius, Curacao, Aruba. You will think of some Caribbean states and
territories as vacation spots, great for Spring break which is coming up
within the next month. And, of course, the United States also is present with
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
As there are several varieties of sovereignty and different stages of self-
determination in the overseas dependent territories, states, departements, in
the Caribbean, no individual territory finds its situation replicated in
another. Each has its own deal with its former colonizer-that is, former
mother country. In addition, however, we have islands, such as Jamaica,
such as Trinidad, such as Barbados, and so on, that are independent states
and are attempting to make their way in this new era of globalization, of 193
countries, or 192 until Southern Sudan becomes independent. So, in the
Caribbean, you will see that there are states, nation states-members of the
UN-such as Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, Antigua, as well as other
entities, overseas dependent territories.
What does it mean: "Overseas dependent territories?" In the context of
the Caribbean, the descriptor includes the islands which are not sovereign
states, as they have not secured independence from their colonizers. As
2. And I have an illustrative story with respect to Anguilla. That is, in the 1970s or
80s, the British wanted to get rid of Anguilla, so they put forward the proposition that
Anguilla should be governed from St. Kitts and Nevis. Now, the Anguillans-and if you've
been to Anguilla, it's a sandbar basically, beautiful colored beaches and all that-they
revolted and asked to be put back under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. So they
continued to be an overseas dependent territory of the United Kingdom, instead of joining St.
Kitts and Nevis, a twin island nation state.
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such, they "have surrendered aspects of their political, economic and
cultural identities to external centres of power."'
Now, these jurisdictions, to the extent that they are independent, are
members of the World Trade Organization. In addition, there is a primarily
Anglophone community, a regional grouping called CARICOM: the
community of Caribbean states. This was supposed to be a regional pooling
of sovereignty to create a counterbalance to economic pressures coming
from outside the region.'
I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the potential limits
of my perspective and to admit that I am an Anglophone in the context of
the Caribbean because, as you may know, in the Caribbean you will speak
of the Anglophone, Francophone, Spanish and Dutch speaking islands and
territories. My interests and analysis have focused mostly on the
Anglophone Caribbean, with some references to the Francophone and
Spanish speaking entities.
Within these definitional and affinity constraints, I will now address
some particular examples of challenges to Caribbean economic sovereignty
and my analysis of their broader implications.
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CHALLENGES TO CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY
My remarks will focus on the recent illustrative challenges listed below:
A. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) anti-tax haven initiative;
B. The OECD-Financial Action Task Force (FATF)
anti-money laundering initiative;
C. The United States-European Union (EU) World
Trade Organization (WTO) banana dispute;
D. The termination of European Union sugar subsidies
pursuant to WTO rules;
E. The Antigua-United States WTO internet gambling
dispute; and
F. The EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership
Agreement
3. Peter Clegg and Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Preface, in GOVERNANCE IN THE NON-
INDEPENDENT CARIBBEAN: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
supra note 3, at xvii. The authors describe the territories' dissatisfaction with the status quo,
despite, or perhaps because, independence does not appear to be a viable option for these
small islands and island chains. Id.
4. See Karen E. Bravo, CARICOM, the Myth of Sovereignty, and Aspirational
Economic Integration, 31 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 145, 155-60 (2005) [hereinafter
Bravo, CARICOMJ.
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A. OECD Anti-Tax Haven Initiative
Beginning in 2001, the OECD initiated negotiations with countries it
considered to be tax havens, meaning that the tax regulations and structures
of those economies were unfair and illegal according to the criteria
introduced by the OECD.' The organization also began an initiative to list
and target states, which it claimed, or which, according to its standards,
were tax havens. The OECD used leverage and threats to try to get countries
to make significant tax reforms and essentially bullied countries into
making such changes.6 The designation of a jurisdiction as a "tax haven"
depended on the OECD's determination that the favorable tax treatment
offered by the jurisdiction in question was luring money and taxpayers from
other, "more honest" jurisdictions. It is noteworthy that the "other, more
honest" jurisdictions that suffered the allegedly negative effects were
Western-oriented, wealthier countries. That is, more favorable tax treatment
was given to taxpayers leaving the United States, the European Union, and
other jurisdictions to invest their money in the alleged tax havens.
In this regard, we must now scrutinize the OECD. Now what is the
OECD? It is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.
Who are the member states of that organization? They are the states with the
largest economies in the world.
The organization is an exclusive club, composed of the 34 states with the
world's largest economies. The membership is almost exclusively Western
5. The OECD considers countries that, in their opinion, offer tax rates that are low
enough to be considered nominal to be tax havens, which allow taxpayers to evade their
domestic tax authorities. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE
32 (1998). In fact, the OECD labels a country a tax haven if: (1) it imposes no or only
nominal taxes; (2) it offers a lack of transparency about the application of tax laws and about
underlying documentation; (3) it has laws or administrative practices that prevent the
effective exchange of information for tax purposes with other governments about taxpayers
who benefit from zero or nominal taxation; (4) the absence of a requirement that the
taxpayer's activity within the country's jurisdiction be substantial. Samantha H. Scavron,
Note, In Pursuit of Offshore Tax Evaders: The Increased Importance of International
Cooperation in Tax Treaty Negotiations after United States v. UBS AG, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L.
Po'Y &ETHIcs J. 157, 165-66 (2010).
6. Taylor Morgan Hoffman, Development, The Future of Offshore Tax Havens, 2
CHI. J. INT'L L. 511, 512 (2001). The actions taken by the OECD have been characterized as
"economic imperialism" whereby large, powerful states exert their will over small offshore
jurisdictions that threaten the financial dominance of the world powers. Richard K. Gordon,
On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and Offshore Financial
Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 534-35 (2010). Gordon contends that there has been a shift
from state actors directly implementing their global governance agendas to international
bodies controlled by the world powers essentially serving as a proxy to direct and implement
the agendas and restrict the growth of developing economies. Id. at 506-08.
7. For a complete list of the OECD's membership, see OECD, List of OECD
Member Countries-Ratification of the Convention on the OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1889402-1_1_1_1,00.html (last
visited October 31, 2011).
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and European, with the exception of Chile, Japan, Korea, Turkey, Mexico,
and Israel. No African, Pacific, or Caribbean states are represented. The
organization excludes the voices of the world's other 160 states. The
composition and authority of the OECD is not representative. That is, it is
not a universal membership body; instead, its membership is limited to
economies of a certain size. There was no democratic participation in
standard-setting by the territories and countries listed as tax havens.' The
OECD listed a number of Caribbean entities in its offshore tax haven
report.9 Among the Caribbean states and territories included in the list were:
Antigua, Barbados, The Bahamas, The Cayman Islands, The Turks and
Caicos Islands, and the twin island nation of St. Kitts and Nevis. The list
included overseas dependent territories as well as nation states. Each of
these entities had begun the process of successfully diversifying their
economies from agriculture into financial and other service sectors.
There was great uproar. The response in the Caribbean was to
characterize the listing and resulting economic pressures as discriminatory
economic blackmail.'o The effect of the blacklist was severe:" Immediate
results were that multinationals-banking and financial entities-
8. One author critiques the OECD for trying to impose its will on states that are not
even OECD members and for encroaching on the sovereignty of nations. See Alexander
Townsend Jr., The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development's Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
215, 215 (2001). Townsend asserts that telling states how they must form and implement
their tax policies is a serious threat to the sovereignty of nations. Id. at 220-21. He also notes
that the OECD is telling these sovereign nations how they need to decide their fiscal needs,
and how they are to decide their fiscal needs. Id. at 219-20.
9. See OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING
AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICE 17 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf.
10. See OECD Tax List Called "Economic Blackmail," ALLBUSINESS.COM, (Aug. 1,
2000), http://www.allbusiness.com/finance/581057-1.html [hereinafter Economic
Blackmail].
11. The OECD has clearly impacted the financial sectors of Caribbean nations and
territories. Diane Ring, Who is Making International Tax Policy?: International
Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 649, 710-
11 (2010). In addition, the United States has unilaterally set its sights on Caribbean nations
with growing financial sectors as well. The United States has strayed from the OECD's
model for addressing such issues and employed a number of tactics to discourage the use of
Caribbean banks, including subjecting people and organizations to audits for simply
transacting with offshore Caribbean financial institutions. Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural
Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No
Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 331, 336 (2003). As the United States continues to
see greater deficits in the budget, it is increasingly likely that it will put even more pressures
on anyone that uses Caribbean banking facilities. Id. at 390. The events of September 11,
2001 is used as a justification for the necessity of preventing countries from having
preferential taxing and banking practices. See Bruce Zagaris, Revisiting Novel Approaches to
Combating the Financing of Crime, 50 VILL. L. REv. 509, 511 (2005). See generally Elwood
Sanders Jr. & George Sanders, The Effect of the USA Patriot Act on the Money Laundering
and Currency Transaction Laws, 4 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 47 (2004).
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announced that they would exit these countries and territories and the
targeted states and territories feared negative reputational effects would take
place. In addition, there was uncertainty regarding the enforcement action
that the member states of the OECD might take if their multinational
corporations (MNC's) did not exit the Caribbean states.
So, as I said, that initiative began in 2000, and by 2009 most or actually
all countries and territories were off the blacklist. 12 We still have now a gray
list.13 The gray list is a group of countries that said "yes, we will accede to
your demands." But, the OECD says: "Well, you're not carrying it out in as
quick a fashion, you're not implementing these commitments as we would
like." So now several Caribbean countries are on the gray list of potential
tax havens.'4
B. OECD/FATF: Anti-Money Laundering Initiative
In 2003, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's
(OECD) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued a new revision of its
Forty Recommendations, which had been first issued in 1990 and which
form the baseline standards for the international prevention of and fight
against money laundering by banking and financial systems and institutions.
That same year, the FATF issued a list of Non-Cooperating Territories and
Countries (the NCCT list), naming countries whose banking and financial
laws and regulations did not meet the standards set forth in the updated
Forty Recommendations.
The purpose of the Financial Action Tax Force is anti-money laundering
activities: that is, the perception that monies were being transferred around
the world in a sub rosa fashion by drug traffickers, corrupt governments,
and corrupt private parties, and were being facilitated by the banking system
in particular countries.'5 Prior to the issuance of the NCCT list in 2003, in
12. At the G-7 meeting in July of 2007, the world powers' Finance Ministers agreed
that sanctions they called "defensive measures" would be placed upon uncooperative tax
havens. Hoffman, supra note 5, at 512. The Caribbean countries were originally encouraged
by the British in the 1960s to diversify their economies by creating financial sectors; the
sectors have since grown to the point that they made up as much as a quarter of some
countries' economies. Id. at 512-13. The United States' stance is that the offshore accounts
were accounting for $70 billion a year in lost tax revenue. Id. at 513.
13. See Ulrich Eder, The Caribbean, The OECD and The Empty Black List,
31CARIBBEAN PROPERTY MAGAZINE (Aug. 2009),
http://www.caribpro.com/CaribbeanProperty-Magazine/index.php?pageid=717.
14. These include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Cayman Islands, among
others. Id.
15. For a thorough discussion of the initiative, see Karen E. Bravo, Follow the
Money? Does the International Fight Against Money Laundering Provide A Model for
International Anti-Human Trafficking Efforts?, 6 ST. THOMAS L.J. 138, 160-66, 173-79
(2008). Those considered to be countries that support or allow money laundering are often
depicted as countries run by greedy, selfish bureaucrats who simply want money and do not
care whether they are giving terrorist organizations and criminals a place to carry out their
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February 2000, the FATF had published the Report on Non-Cooperative
Countries and Territories (the Initial 2000 NCCT Report) and, in three
subsequent reports, identified countries and territories that it would
investigate and review in order to determine NCCT designation. The list
included 15 countries and territories. Similarly to the anti-tax haven
initiative, several Caribbean states and territories were included on the list.
By late 2007, when the FATF issued the 2006/2007 list of Non-Cooperating
Territories and Countries, no jurisdictions remained on the list-all the
formerly non-compliant states and territories are now compliant or their
compliance was in the process of being confirmed. That is, within eight
years, all the territories identified as an NCCT, or potential NCCT, had
taken steps comply with the standards of the Forty Recommendations, had
been investigated and/or monitored, and were de-listed. 16
The non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCTs) initiative was
created to ensure that all countries adopt anti-money laundering measures. 17
Once again, the non-representative nature of the membership of the
international organization that is the source of the rule making, monitoring,
and sanctioning is striking. The FATF is an independent inter-governmental
organization created by the G-7/OECD in 1989. As with the tax haven
initiative, the standards were formulated by a non-representative body-that
is, no input from the countries that would be subject to those standards. The
project was intended to force non-member states and jurisdictions with
deficient anti-money laundering systems to create new legislation by
adopting a "name-and-shame" device-in the form of the published list of
non-compliant jurisdictions-and by encouraging FATF members to take
actions to convince NCCTs of the importance of adopting such legislation.
The criteria for identifying NCCTs consist of a range of detrimental rules
and practices in and by a country or territory that obstruct international
cooperation against money laundering. These detrimental rules can be found
in a NCCT's financial and other regulatory requirements (especially those
related to identification), their rules regarding international administrative
and judicial cooperation, and the resources the country has made available
illegal activities on an international scale. See William F. Wechsler, Follow the Money, 80
FOREIGN AFF. 41, 41-43 (2001). Countries that choose to respect the privacy of their
investors are seen as safe havens for those wishing to conduct illegal money laundering
activities, despite the reality that such privacy is likely to be just as appreciated by those that
do not have any illegal intentions. Id. at 42. The inherent assumption that the alleged money
laundering havens merely intend to service criminals fails to take into account that many of
the states with laws favorable to investors are created to give them some sort of a general
competitive advantage in the financial sector that they would not otherwise have with
uniform laws. Shawn Turner, U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: An Economic
Approach to Cyberlaundering, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1389, 1399-1400 (2004).
16. See Bravo, supra note 15, at 160-66.
17. Jared Wessel, The Financial Action Task Force: A Study in Balancing
Sovereignty with Equality in Global Administrative Law, 13 WIDENER L. REv. 169, 174
(2006).
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for preventing, detecting, and repressing money laundering. 8 There is no
specific criterion that can serve as a litmus test; rather, a jurisdiction should
be judged based on the entirety of its efforts to combat money laundering.
Also noteworthy is the intrusive and very effective nature of the
monitoring imposed, under threat of sanctions, on non-FATF and non-
OECD states. 9 For the most part, Caribbean countries have complied with
the regulations established regarding money laundering, but they have had
to do so because if they did not, economic disaster would result-their
economies simply are not strong enough to survive for long while under
siege from the world powers.20 What does it mean? Sovereign states are
subject to intrusive monitoring by the FATF and have changed their internal
regulations in order to comply with the standards issued from above,
without their participation, that is, from the OECD.2 1
C. WTO: United States-European Union Banana Dispute
Let us address now challenges with respect to the trade in goods. None
of the Caribbean states or territories are members of the OECD or of the
FATF. This non-membership contrasts with their status in the World Trade
Organization. The Caribbean states are members of the WTO; in fact, they
are founding members because they had been members of the GATT.22
18. Id.
19. For example, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) was
established in 1996 and received a great deal of criticism from both sides of the issue. PETER
REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY
LAUNDERING 84 (2004). One of the primary problems with the CFATF is that it exercises
peer review of members and does some global supervision, but has little to no power to
require compliance with sanctions. Id. at 85. After 9/11, the United States has tried to correct
these flaws in implementation. Id.
20. G. Scott Dowling, Comment, Fatal Broadside: The Demise of Caribbean
Offshore Financial Confidentiality Post USA PATRIOT Act, 17 TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 292
(2004).The broad wording of the PATRIOT Act gives the U.S. a number of weapons in its
arsenal to change the financial practices of Caribbean countries indefinitely. Id. at 292-93.
The Bahamas and the Cayman Islands have been two of the more "cooperative" Caribbean
jurisdictions, and foreign states often make requests for information regarding certain clients;
more often than not, the requests are honored. Evan Metaxatos, Thunder in Paradise: The
Interplay of Broadening United States Anti-Money Laundering Legislation and
Jurisprudence with the Caribbean Law Governing Offshore Asset Preservation Trusts, 40 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 169, 188-89 (2008).
21. Critics have argued that the FATF's actions are a form of interference and an
impingement on the sovereignty of the nations targeted by the FATF, and that sanctions, if
imposed, would be a violation of the UN Charter because such measures are supposed to be
addressed by the UN Security Council. Todd Doyle, Note, Cleaning up Anti-Money
Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law, 24
Hous. J. INT'L L. 279, 300-301 (2001-2002).
22. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
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The long-running banana dispute between the United States and the
European Union resulted in the loss of preferential access that the European
Union had extended to banana exports from African, Caribbean, and Pacific
countries that are former colonies of EU member states. Brought by the
United States, and making claims with respect to bananas produced in South
America, the dispute is one of the longest-running (spanning 1993 to
2010)23 and most seemingly intractable in the history of the World Trade
Organization.
The question was whether the preferential access given by EU member
states to their former colonies violated the EU member states' GATT
obligations. And I guess I should give some background: These English-
speaking, Spanish-speaking, and French-speaking territories and countries
were colonies of EU member states. Once they were given independence,
part of the deal was: "we will continue to subsidize you, some might even
argue compensate you or make reparations to you, by giving your
agricultural products preferential access to our markets."
The preferential arrangement between EU member states and their
former colonies, between the European Union and those decolonized states,
was found to be illegal. With respect to compliance, the European Union
dragged its feet for a considerable period of time and, in May 2010, finally
consented to comply with the panel report and the compliance panel.
Some interesting facts with respect to the dispute include: (i) Bananas are
a major agricultural crop in the Caribbean;2' (ii) the United States does not
produce bananas; instead, the United States' position represented the
interests of large MNCs (i.e., Dole and Chiquita) who had interests in
banana-producing South American countries (i.e., today's banana
republics); (iii) pursuant to WTO procedural rules and as a result of the
procedural posture of the dispute, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states
and territories, whose market access and economic futures would be
determined by the dispute, were limited to the role of third party observers.
The case was brought by the United States against the European Union,
not because the United States grows bananas, but because it was
representing the interests of the multinational corporations-Dole and
Chiquita for instance-which do have banana growing enterprises in Latin
American countries. The problem, according to their point of view, was
"our bananas are being disadvantaged in the European markets, they're
getting discriminatory treatment because the Caribbean, Pacific and African
bananas are getting in at a lower rate and so are more attractive to
consumers."
23. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regime for the Importation,
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997).
24. According to then-Prime Minister of Jamaica Percival J. Patterson, "Bananas are
to us what cars are to Detroit." WARREN J. KEEGAN & MARK C. GREEN, GLOBAL MARKETING
125 (2d ed. 2000).
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As I have stated, the Caribbean states are members of the WTO.
However, with respect to this decision which has enormous impact on a
substantial part of their economy, these Caribbean states were reduced to
the role of third party observers. That is, they were able to submit
documents and relevant information, but they were not parties, they were
not participants, they were not there as primary actors with respect to their
economic future. Fifty-six of the seventy-eight nations in the ACP that were
to be impacted by the banana settlement are members of the WTO, but were
given no ability to make an impact on the WTO proceedings.25 The WTO
dispute settlement procedures appear to present a threat to the sovereignty
of member states-their ability to take necessary government actions on
behalf of citizens.26 The WTO system as it stands leaves developing
countries in a position where their participation is marginalized and they are
not often a part of proceedings.27
D. WTO: European Union Sugar Subsidies Dispute
In 2003, Australia, Brazil, and Thailand requested the establishment of a
WTO panel to examine the legality of subsidies applied to European
Communities' (EC) sugar.2 8 As had occurred, with respect to bananas, the
European Union's sugar subsidies, challenged by Australia, Brazil, and
Thailand, were found to be illegal. The Dispute Settlement Body's 2004
report, which found that the European Union's sugar regime breached the
European Union's WTO obligations, had a detrimental impact on another
major cash crop of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states and territories.29
As I stated earlier, the agricultural background of the islands means that
sugar and bananas were crucial to their agricultural economy. I should also
add, however, that the Caribbean sugar industry is extremely inefficient and
25. Id.
26. Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef and Compliance in the World Trade
Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance
from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133, 167 (2001).
27. HAIDER A. KHAN & YIBEi Liu, GLOBALIZATION AND THE WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT MECHANISM: MAKING A RULES-BASED TRADING REGIME WORK, 23-24 (2008),
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7613/1/WTO.PDF. The dispute was supposed to be just
limited to bananas, but the European Union has insisted on expanding the package to
encompass other concessions included in the Doha Round. GIOVANNI ANANIA, How WOULD
THE WTO AGREEMENT ON BANANAS AFFECT EXPORTING AND IMPORTING COUNTRIES? 5
(International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Programme on Agricultural
Trade and Sustainable Development June 2009), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/07/web-bananas.pdf.
28. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Export Subsidies on Sugar,
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/ABIR, WT/DS283/ABIR (Apr. 28, 2005), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN viewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocum
ents/t/WT/DS/283ABR.doc.
29. In those countries, sugar and bananas are huge agricultural products and in fact a
substantial part of their economy.
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unproductive and later in this Essay I will address issues of comparative
advantage as well. The fact that Caribbean states and territories would no
longer get access to this market had a huge impact on the day-to-day life
and domestic economies of those countries and on their economic
sovereignty. The changes to the EU sugar regime have been described as
drastic changes that will affect developing and least developed countries
that depend on the preferential treatment received from the European
Union."
The new agreement for tariff-free sugar imports into the EU market did
not fully come into effect until 2009, and the European Union seems to
suggest that it will be beneficial for LDCs and the European Union alike.3'
The new sugar regime stands to leave ACP countries as losers in the new
market system if they are unable to compete with the comparative
advantages other countries enjoy.3 2 The new regime changes the positions of
those that are the winners and those that are the losers and threatens the
already fragile economies of the losers.33 Although the new sugar regime
has an impact on all ACP countries, the Caribbean countries stand out as
greater losers in the newly competitive sugar market than other countries.
E. WTO: Antigua-United States Gambling Dispute
The internet gambling dispute between the United States and Antigua is
historic in scope. It began with Antigua's 35 March 21, 2003 request for
consultation under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding about
United States barriers to the provision of transborder gambling services.36
30. Piero Conforti & George Rapsomanikis, The Impact of the European Union
Sugar Policy Reform on Developing and Least Developed Countries, in FOOD AND
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UN, COMMODITY MARKET REVIEw 89, 90-93 (2005),
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/a0334e/a0334e0f.htm. The author found through
his research that it is not likely that the quantity of sugar exported from the Caribbean should
decrease all that much but, rather, the revenues would be significantly different. The
Caribbean has in fact decreased in both production and revenue from sugar. Id. at 103.
31. LEENA KERKELA & ELLEN HUAN-NIEMI, TRADE PREFERENCES IN THE EU SUGAR
SECTOR: WINNERS AND LOSERS 8 (Purdue Univ. Seminar on Agric. 2005), available at
http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2005/papers/kerkela.pdf.
32. ELLEN HUAN-NIEMI & LEENA KERKELA, REFORM IN THE EU SUGAR REGIME:
IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL SUGAR MARKETS, 4-6 (2005), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edulbitstreami/24733/1/cp05hu02.pdf.
33. Id. at 14.
34. Michael Bruntup, Discussion Paper, Everything But Arms (EBA) and the EU-
Sugar Market Reform-Development Gift or Trojan Horse? 7 (German Development
Institute Oct. 2006), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/
Detail/?ots591- Oc54e3b3-le9c-bele-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=27650.
35. And I challenge you to find Antigua on your map-Antigua, it's on the right
hand side, it's a very tiny twin-island state-Antigua and Barbuda ...
36. See Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States-
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services-Request for
Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/1 (Mar. 27, 2003), available at
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In light of the disparity in power in the WTO,37 I was very, very
surprised in 2003 to learn that Antigua had challenged the United States
about its internet gambling laws. That is, the United States had forbidden
internet gambling, but Antigua had become a huge offshore internet
gambling center-a huge business, with lots of companies going there to
invest and locate their internet gambling sites in that country.
In view of the conflict, Antigua challenged the United States, claiming
that the prohibition violated the United States' WTO obligations under the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) because it was possible to
gamble in the United States in person via casinos, race tracks, and various
other state and private entity sponsored gambling.
The dispute resulted in partial wins for Antigua under both the
November 10, 2004 Panel Report and the April 7, 2005 Appellate Body
report. 38 However, the United States' refusal to comply with the findings
resulted in further proceedings to ensure compliance. 39 Although the WTO
can impose "special and different treatment" provisions to protect the
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-viewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocum
ents/t/SIL/1 10.doc.
37. Kristin Bohl, Problems of Developing Country Access to WTO Dispute
Settlement, 9 CHI. KENT J. INT'L & COMP. L. 130, 131 (2009). The reasons smaller states, like
those in the Caribbean, have trouble with access to the system often include a lack of
resources, small trade volumes, a lack of institutional capacity or a lack of political will. Id.
at 132.
38. Report of the Panel, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/gen-searchResult.asp?RN=0&searchtype=browse&q 1=%28
%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS285%FCR%2A+and+not+RW%2A%29&language= 1;
Report of the Appellate Body, United States-Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/ABIR (Apr. 7, 2005), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/gen-searchResult.aspRN=0&searchtype=browse&q l =%28
%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS285%FCAB%FCR%2A+and+not+RW%2A%29&langua
ge=1. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA) was passed as a
result of the United States losing in its WTO dispute against Antigua and Barbuda. Peter
Shaker, America's Bad Bet: How the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006
Will Hurt the House, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1183, 1198 (2007).
39. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, United States-
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services
WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN-viewer
window.asphttp://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments//WT/DS/285RW-00.doc. The
initial reaction by Antigua to the favorable ruling was that the win was a great victory,
especially for such a little country. Daniel Pruzin, Antigua-Barbuda Wins WTO Interim
Ruling Against U.S. Internet Gambling Restrictions, 21 Int'l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 13, 14 (Mar.
25, 2004). However, some scholars still feel that the victory was hollow because the case
"highlights the ineffectiveness of the provisions intended to ensure that developing countries
are able to use and prevail during the WTO dispute settlement process." Id. at 28. The fact of
the matter is that the Antigua has very little it can do to impose sanctions against the United
States Daniel B. Pimlott, WTO Rules Against U.S. in Internet Gambling Case, FIN. TIMES
(London), Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/317e9e48-ad6l -11db-
8709-0000779e2340.html#axzzldBYdeTQQ.
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interests of developing countries from developed countries, the measures
have been critiqued for rarely being implemented and even more rarely
being to the benefit of developing countries. 4 0 Even when measures are
taken, the WTO does not have any teeth to make the United States adhere to
rulings against developing countries: even after two adverse WTO rulings,
the United States still refused to change its position on Antigua and internet
gambling and continued to try to make internet gambling illegal.41
As a result of the compliance proceedings, on December 23, 2007 the
WTO arbitrator authorized Antigua to assert $21 million nullification of
benefits against U.S. intellectual property that was protected pursuant to the
TRIPS Agreement.4 2 That is, Antigua was given permission to violate the
TRIPs with respect to U.S. intellectual property up to the amount of $21
million without violating its obligations under the WTO Agreement. 43 The
United States' response was to announce that it was withdrawing from its
GATS obligations as they pertained to internet gambling.4
40. Amin Alavi, On the (Non)-Effectiveness of the World Trade Organization's
Special and Different Treatments in the Dispute Settlement Process, 41 J. WORLD TRADE
319, 320 (Apr. 2007).
41. See Andrea Ewart, Small Developing States in the WTO: A Procedural Approach
to Special and Differential Treatment through Reforms to Dispute Settlement, 35 SYRACUSE
J. INT'L L. & CoM. 27, 55 (2007).
42. The WTO ruling was a potentially significant move by the WTO in favor of
small countries because Antigua was permitted to suspend $21 million annually in IP rights
held by firms from the United States See Isaac Wohi, The Antigua-United States Online
Gambling Dispute, 4 J. INT'L COMM. & EcON. 1, 2-3 (2009). This remedy was chosen by the
WTO because a remedy allowing suspension of obligations to the US would have almost no
effect in a developed country such as the United States Clint Bodien, Cross-Retaliation in the
WTO: Antigua and Barbuda's Proposed Remedy against the United States in an Online
Gambling, 14 L. & Bus. REV. Am. 847, 853 (2008). The ruling gives small countries the
potential to create leverage in future disputes. Wohl, supra, at 16. The decision was
especially notable because it was an instance where the 15'h smallest country in the world
went head to head with the world's economic superpower and left the WTO with a sound
victory. Ewart, supra note 41, at 27.
43. The suspension of IP rights of U.S. firms was notable because the WTO DSB
recognized that traditional remedies would not likely be enforceable because of the disparity
in size of the countries. Bodien, supra note 42, at 855. However, Antigua could also lose its
MFN status with the United States via the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) because the CBI
includes a requirement of recognition and enforcement of U.S. IP rights as one of the
requirements for the MFN status. Id. at 855. The bottom line is that the DSB's decision could
have ended up being more detrimental than beneficial for Antigua. Id.
44. Yevgeniya Roysen, Taking Chances: The United States' Policy on Internet
Gambling and Its International Implications, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 873, 875 (2008-
2009). On April 15th, 2011, the FBI indicted 11 of the founders from the three largest online
poker websites and shut down the websites. Michael McCarthy, FBI Busts Three Biggest
Online Poker Hhouses, USA TODAY, (Apr. 16, 2011), available at
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/gameon/post/2011/04/fbi-cracks-down-on-3-
biggest-online-poker-houses-poker-stars-full-tilt-poker-absolute-poker/1. The indictees were
charged with bank fraud, money laundering, and illegal gambling offenses. Id. The
prosecutors cited the UIGEA as the grounds for the indictments. Id. Until the very recent
indictments, the WTO decision had left the operators of the online gambling websites unsure
[Vol. 20:146
Challenges to Caribbean Economic Sovereignty
I would ask you to think about the effect or the benefit of this $21
million of lIP nullification to Antigua. That is, I am able to violate your
intellectual property rights up to the amount of $21 million versus having an
economy or an industry that actually functions and employs Antiguan
citizens and brings in tax revenue to the state. Furthermore, the fact that a
small nation won against an economic superpower, yet ultimately still lost,
only emphasizes the flaws in the WTO system: Developed countries
essentially do what they like, regardless of their commitments to the
WTO.4
F. EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is the premier Caribbean
regional integration organization.' Founded in 1973, the organization first
consisted of Anglophone former colonies of the United Kingdom.
Membership has expanded to include Haiti. CARIFORUM is a broader
organization that includes the Dominican Republic.
Following the WTO proceedings in the banana wars, in view of the need
to re-arrange the economic and trade relationship between the EU member
states and their former ACP colonies, the European Union entered into
economic partnership agreements with different regional groupings of
African, Caribbean, and Pacific former colonies. Broadly, pursuant to the
terms of the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), access
to the EU markets is no longer unconditional: Products of the
CARIFORUM states will receive duty-free and quota-free access to the
markets of EU member states. In return, products from EU member states
will face decreasing barriers to the markets of the Dominican Republic and
CARICOM member states. CARIFORUM states have agreed to liberalize
80 percent of imports over 15 years and will liberalize the remaining 20
percent over 20 to 25 years.47
of the legality of their activities. Tom Newnham, Note, WTO Case Study: United States-
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 7 ASPER
REV. INT'L Bus. & TRADE L. 77, 81 (2007). The constitutionality of UIGEA was challenged
in 2008 by a non-profit advocacy group, but the case was dismissed in an unpublished
opinion. Kristina L. Perry, Note, Current State of the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act and Recently Adopted Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet
Gambling, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 29, 31 (2008-2009). The court did not state whether
the dismissal was based on a lack of standing or for failure to state a claim. Id.
45. Michael Grunfeld, Note, Don't Bet on the United States's Internet Gambling
Laws: The Tension between Internet Gambling Legislation and World Trade Organization
Commitments, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 439, 501-03 (2007).
46. For a thorough discussion of CARICOM, see Bravo, CARICOM, supra note 4, at
167-89.
47. See Anthony Gomes, Phasing of Tariff Liberalization on European Union
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What does it mean? What are the terms of the deal? Access to the EU
markets is no longer unconditional. So, the good deal that the former
colonies had was that their preferential access to EU markets was not
reciprocal. That is, the Caribbean states and territories got preferential
access but could still keep their tariffs and get revenue from the European
Union's products coming in. Now it's no longer unconditional, so the
products of the CARIFORUM states will get duty free and quota free access
to the EU markets but, in return, tariffs must be removed with respect to 80
percent of imports over 15 years and the remaining 20 percent over a 20 to
25 year period.
Arrived at following four years of negotiation, the treaty is
controversial 48 and has stimulated much debate in the region regarding
whether the economic effects will be beneficial for the Caribbean. For
example, the loss of tariff revenues will be substantial: Based on data for the
2005/06 fiscal period, at the end of the liberalization period Jamaica is
estimated to lose approximately $1.34 billion in both tariff and non-tariff
revenues, or 96 percent of tariff revenues previously collected from EU
imports.49
So, having finally acceded to the banana dispute resolution, the European
Union negotiates with its former colonies to come into compliance with its
WTO obligations. Through the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership
Agreement, the European Union is attempting to rearrange its relationship
with those colonies so that it comes into compliance. However, freed finally
by its decision to comply with the banana decision, the European Union's
negotiations are no longer premised on the idea of giving unconditional aid
to its colonies. Now we can bargain hard because we have been told that
this preferential access violates our WTO obligations, right?
Despite the agreement, the Caribbean continues to resist implementation.
There's the promising and then the complying.50 So, the agreement was
48. 1 can't tell you how many editorials were published in the papers in the
Caribbean Islands in which dire predictions have been made regarding what will be the effect
of this agreement, or whether the CARICOM and Dominican Republic should have held out
for a better deal or some other kind of deal with the European Union because this, they said,
would be the end of the region. See, e.g., Rickey Singh, 'EPA Nightmare,' JAMAICA
OBSERVER, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/139937_-EPA-nightmare-.
49. See Gomes, supra note 47.
50. In response to the lack of implementation of the EPA by Caribbean countries,
CARIFORUM has agreed that it will establish an "EPA Implementation Unit" by July of
2011. Dixie-Ann Dickson, EPA Implementation Unit Coming in July Says Cadiz, TRINIDAD
GUARDIAN (Trinidad & Tobago), Apr. 4, 2011, http://guardian.co.tt/business/2011/04/04/epa-
implementation-unit-coming-july-says-cadiz. It seems like one of the biggest obstacles to
implementing this for Caribbean countries has been getting local business to be comfortable
with the changes. Id. Cariforum is using information seminars aimed at local business
owners and the European Union's offer of aid for trade and the promise to offer technologies
as an incentive for local businesses that are reluctant to get on board with the EPA. Id. The
stresses from the outside to adjust their economies have caused stresses within. Although the
countries within the region have many similarities, there are rivalries and social differences
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signed at the end of 2008 and was supposed to come in effect on January 1,
of this year-201 1. As of late February 2011, only Guyana" had
implemented the agreement. Further, it took two years before the regional
body, CARICOM, set up an implementation body to ensure member state
compliance with the treaty.
Ill. IMPLICATIONS FOR CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY
What do these series of events reveal about the economic sovereignty of
the states and territories of the Caribbean? Individually and collectively,
they demonstrate that Caribbean states and territories lack economic
sovereignty and are thus unable to chart their own economic destiny. I
would say that their situation is very similar to the situation of other small
and micro states that do not have economic heft. Their market is not that
attractive, they do not have enough population or economic activity to bring
in investors and investments from abroad, so they are left to react rather
than to create their own initiatives. The effects of these challenges will be
adverse impacts on their major agricultural industries, which as I noted
before, are quite inefficient. As a result of the OECD's anti-tax haven and
anti-money laundering initiatives, their provision of financial and
recreational services has now been adversely impacted as well.
It is not hyperbole to state that the economic sovereignty challenges call
into question the viability of fundamental tenets of international trade law.
The challenges that I have described have adversely impacted the region's
major agricultural industries. The region's rather successful turn toward the
provision of financial and recreational services was negatively impacted by
the OECD's anti-tax haven and anti-money laundering efforts. The
provision of the more "innocuous" recreational services (gambling) by some
states and territories has been stymied. The region must now continue its
search for the next comparative advantage. But will that comparative
advantage be deemed acceptable by the international community's
regulatory organizations?
which make integrating further more difficult. David Jessop, Op-Ed., Caricom's Problems
Create Doubts for Partners, DOMINICAN TODAY (Dominican Republic), Apr. 8, 2011,
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/opinion/2011/4/8/39188/Caricoms-problems-create-
doubts-for-partners. The rivalries between islands may not be overcome quickly enough to
implement effective coalitions for economic growth.
51. And I also meant to say I apologize because my map does not show Guyana.
Guyana is actually on the South American continent but is considered to be in the Caribbean
by Anglophones in the Caribbean based on historical ties. Caribbean countries are well
behind in implementing their EPA obligations on tariff dismantlement; the deadline was the
beginning of the year, and thus far only Guyana and St. Kitts Nevis have met their
obligations. Id. The lack of uniformity and agreement between Caribbean countries seems
likely to lead to greater questions being raised about the purpose of such regional
organizations. Id.
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In the context of evaluating the impact of these challenges, let's think
about comparative advantage now. What is "comparative advantage?"
Pursuant to the theory of comparative advantage, a state should produce and
trade in the products and services in which it has a comparative advantage
in comparison to the other products and services that it could produce. That
is, you should do what you're best at, right? And trade what you're best at
producing.
Comparative advantage is impermanent. Each trading partner must be
endlessly flexible and must continuously engage in formulating and
exploring new sources or formats of its comparative advantage. The
Caribbean region's transition from the provision of agricultural products to
the provision of varied services-tourism, financial, recreational (i.e.,
gambling)--demonstrates the impermanence of comparative advantage. At
one point, they were the best, or at least good, at banana and sugar
production; now they are very good at tourism services, right? 2 But also
several are very good at financial services and banking. Think of
transitioning from the purely agricultural model to the financial services and
banking model and even to the more or less innocuous internet gambling
model.
The transition to their next comparative advantage would be facilitated
by their exercise of economic sovereignty by creating a regulatory regime
attractive to those who want to park their money here, escape taxes there, or
play and gamble on the internet. However, this process of transition has
been foreclosed or substantially restricted by the top-down imposition of
regulations by a non-representative-I would claim a non-representative-
international body-the OECD. That is, the region's search for a new
comparative advantage has been undermined to a great extent so that the
movement away from agriculture to another kind of paradigm-searching
for the services industry that these countries would be very suited for-has
not been completed at this point, or is being stultified.
According to the theory of comparative advantage, the WTO trading
partners or parties need to be very flexible in finding what their comparative
advantage is going to be. The Caribbean may also demonstrate that
sovereignty itself-the power to create regulatory regimes within a territory
or state-may be a source of comparative advantage. They seem to have
found a comparative advantage that consists of using sovereignty itself to
create regulatory regimes that would facilitate economic activity and
economic access for their citizens.
Yet sovereignty itself is an uncertain source of comparative advantage
since it is constricted and shrinking in scope due to multilateral treaties,
geopolitical realities, and other commitments.
What is the impact of large-country policies, which may stem from anti-
competitive intent and have anti-competitive impact, in undermining the
52. Thus, the Caribbean as a favored destination for Spring Break.
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search for comparative advantage by the less powerful? Will comparative
advantage of weaker states only be explored at the discretion of and
pursuant to the terms agreed to by larger economies?
Yet that reality-a top-down imposition of rules of indeterminate
legitimacy-is detrimental to both the United States and the Caribbean. For
example, the decrease in banana production in the region has led to an
increase in production of marijuana and an increased role in provision of
illicit transborder services. Drug trafficking is now the most viable and
productive economic activity for the dislocated banana or sugar farmer and
for others dependent on the banana industry.
What might be the region's comparative advantage-proximity to the
United States or the possession of Anglophone populations in a world where
English is predominant? Anything else? Do these small countries and
territories actually have anything to offer in a globalized world? Anything
other than white or golden powdery beaches, tropical climates, and endless
sunshine?
Further analysis of the meaning of these challenges to Caribbean
sovereignty can be organized under several banners: (1) the interaction of
sovereignty and membership; (2) sovereignty and legitimacy; (3)
sovereignty and illicit trade; and (4) sovereignty, size, and power
imbalances.
A. Sovereignty and Membership
Does membership in multilateral organizations confer sovereignty
enhancing benefits? The circumstances of the affected Caribbean states and
territories starkly demonstrate an inability to effectively participate in
situations of both membership and non-membership: Contrast the
challenges presented by the OECD anti-tax haven and anti-money
laundering initiatives with the challenges arising from the results of the
sugar, banana, and gambling disputes under the auspices of the WTO. That
is, Caribbean state membership in the WTO does not appear to have
conferred any significant benefit to the Caribbean states with respect to
resolution of these disputes. The states and territories were subjected to the
OECD anti-tax haven and anti-money laundering initiatives despite non-
membership in either the OECD or the FATF. Yet, as members of the
WTO, in the sugar and banana disputes, they were limited to 3 party
observer status despite the fundamental importance of the outcomes of both
of those disputes to their economic health and futures. With respect to the
gambling dispute, the small size and lack of economic and political power
of Antigua was not overcome by its membership in the WTO. Instead, the
United States was able to ignore and/or refuse compliance with the panel
and Appellate Body reports, with no adverse economic or other effects on
the United States. In contrast, the Antigua offshore gambling industry was
virtually destroyed.
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The result is the same. As a member with a voice in the WTO, a
Caribbean state or territory is foreclosed with respect to the dispute central
to its economy just as they were foreclosed from participation due to the
membership requirements with respect to the OECD. Once the more
powerful economies have identified a threat to their own regulatory
regime-that is, here are our own tax dollars fleeing elsewhere or here are
potential havens for money laundering-they determine that reform is
needed. Their influence means that they are able to force these targeted
countries to change their internal domestic regulations. So there was no
difference. Whether there was membership or not, the outcome was the
same: loss of market, loss of control, and demonstration of powerlessness
against larger economic powers.
However, note that with respect to Caribbean states' membership in
CARICOM, those states have manifested great skittishness with respect to
their membership obligations, and a general reluctance to pool membership,
leading to a largely ineffective organization.53 Note, as well, other
manifestation of sovereign prerogative: lack of implementation with respect
to the CARIFORUM-EU Partnership Agreement.54
My question is, if there is no value, or little value, to sovereignty, what is
the point of participation, of voice, of access, of whether you are a member
or a nonmember in these international institutions? Contrasting the impact
of the OECD anti-tax haven and anti-money laundering regime and the
effects of the WTO bananas, sugar, and internet gambling dispute, it seems
to me that having membership in those international organizations was
virtually meaningless for these countries. What will sovereignty become for
these little places, these micro places? These places, these micro states, may
seem to be inconsequential, to be far away, or great for a Spring Break
vacation, but we are globalized and interlinked; there is a deep
interrelationship. Accessing drugs or accessing the drug market in the
United States coming through the Caribbean is much more possible now
when legitimate economic activity is foreclosed for the individual citizens
in Jamaica.
B. Sovereignty and Illicit Trade
I also want to think about the larger, detrimental impact when the search
for comparative advantage is undermined in this way. I have thought a great
deal about the comparative advantage of Caribbean countries; that is, the
movement away from agriculture to tourism. I think it is clear that tourism
is going to employ a certain number of people but not everyone or even a
majority of the population. So, self-sustaining agriculture would seem to be
53. See generally, Bravo, CARICOM, supra note 4.
54. See discussion supra, Part 11.6.
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a good project. But now, bananas are no longer profitable; it makes no sense
to grow bananas. It makes no sense to grow sugar.
Does anyone know what the number one cash crop is now in the
Caribbean? Marijuana. That is, if I can't grow bananas and find a market for
it, and I can't get a job at the resort, and I can't be involved in a licit
economic industry, I may then explore the relationship between the
legitimate trade links and the illicit or illegitimate trade links. The choice to
that banana farmer is to find the next comparative advantage. Proximity to
the United States is a source of comparative advantage, and the felicity of
being English-speaking in a world where English is the dominant world
language of business and economics is also another source of comparative
advantage. The reality of being shut out from legitimate international
markets-sugar, bananas-has resulted in a huge spike in the production of
marijuana, and provision of illicit services-the transborder shipment is
drugs-services that are not covered under the General Agreement on Trade
in Services or other WTO agreements or instruments.
What is the effect of that move to illicit business on the sovereignty of
these states? The last time that Jamaica actually hit the news in the United
States in a big way was the embarrassing scenario last year where a certain
drug don called Dudus faced an extradition request from the United States.
Curiously enough, the drug don lived in the constituency of the Prime
Minister of Jamaica. Curiously enough, someone in the government of
Jamaica contacted a high flying and high priced law firm in Washington,
D.C. to fight the extradition on the basis of sovereignty-the sovereignty of
the Jamaican state, the nation state. When this news broke in Jamaica, there
was outrage that Jamaican laws were being used to defend the alleged drug
king pin, but there was also great denial on the part of the government:
denial of involvement. The governmental systems appeared to be corrupted,
with some participation of the Prime Minister, Bruce Golding." In fact, as
we meet and speak here in Lansing, Michigan, the Manatt Commission of
Inquiry is underway in Kingston, Jamaica, attempting to identify the
existence and source of corruption in the system and the reasons why
Jamaica first refused to extradite Mr. Christopher Coke (or Dudus), the
infamous drug lord.56
55. See Paul Henry, Golding Maintains that Manatt Did not work for Government,
JAMAICA OBSERVER, Mar. 2, 2011, http://www.jamaicaobserver.comlnews/-Golding-
maintains-that-Manatt-did-not-work-for-Gov-t; Marc Lacey, U.S. Extradition Effort Strains
Relationship with Jamaica, N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 25, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/americas/26jamaica.html?ref=christophercoke.
56. See Tanesha Mundle, Nelson Denies Saying Coke Extradition Could Topple
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Sovereignty then was being used as a banner, as a protective shield, for
an accused drug trafficker. That was the argument, we're not going to
extradite because it violates our sovereignty that the United States wants us
to extradite this person, used as a shield for illicit activities, right? So,
Jamaica experienced an island-wide manhunt for this individual57 at the
same time that the government was trying to fight his extradition based on
notions of the sovereignty of the Jamaican state.
C. Sovereignty and Legitimacy
I also want to think about sovereignty and legitimacy, to question the
legitimacy of the top-down creation and implementation of standards by the
OECD. The United Nations is like sausage making: everyone goes in and
speaks, and no one can come to a decision. With the FATF, in contrast, you
have a single purpose, exclusive membership organization. You can actually
create rules. But to what extent are these rules then being used to facilitate
the economic development of one set of countries versus the domination of
smaller, less powerful states?
What is the source, if any, of the legitimacy of the anti-money laundering
and anti-tax haven initiatives of the OECD and the FATF, both of which are
limited-even exclusive-membership and limited-purpose economic
institutions? That is, what is the source of the standards deployed? What is
the nature of the participation of the "subjects" of these rules? Did the
subjects-"sovereign states"-participate in crafting them? Despite the
doubts regarding legitimacy of the power exercised by the organizations,
there is no doubt regarding the effectiveness of their strategies supported, as
they are, by the power of the largest trading economies.
D. Sovereignty, Size, and Power Imbalances: More about Legitimacy
Caribbean states and territories are small in size and lack resources. As a
result, their ability to participate effectively in multilateral organizations is
negatively impacted.
In addition, the Caribbean states' and territories' responses to the
economic challenges manifest an inability to withstand reputational
pressures. Despite protestations about the legitimacy-both with respect to
the source of the standards and the discriminatory application-and
purposes of the OECD anti-tax haven and OECDIFATF anti-money
laundering initiatives, all the Caribbean states and territories capitulated to
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the pressures, as did all other targets of the FATF. Their capitulation must
be contrasted to the reactions of the United States and the European Union
to the outcomes of the beef hormones and gambling disputes. Economic
and other sources of power allowed both of these players to avoid effective
implementation of ostensibly neutral rules.
And then there is the question of sovereignty and size. Should we have
small states? Does it make sense? What does sovereignty entail if there will
be an inability to actually carve a path in the increasingly interdependent
world? What function does sovereignty provide for these entities? It is nice
to have the flag and the athletes at the Olympic Games and various cultural
things, but does it really provide for the economic benefit, the political
benefit of the citizens of that territory or geographic space?
CONCLUSIONS
The recent challenges to Caribbean economic sovereignty give rise to a
number of questions. These are: Does membership in multilateral
organizations confer benefits to small states? Or does the membership of
such states help to facilitate paralysis in decision-making? For example, the
WTO's Doha Round paralysis stems from the attempt to give voice to "too
many" points of view, while at the same time illustrating the limits of
participatory democracy. Does the contrast between the "effectiveness" of
the FATF's standard-setting and implementation with the WTO's decision-
making and standard-setting challenges demonstrate the need for the raw
exercise of political power in international relations and law?
Secondly, the challenges demonstrate the effects of power disparities-
both with respect to geographic and population size as well as to economic
size and influence.
Thirdly, this examination of those challenges calls into question the
legitimacy and impact of limited member international organizations. Do
they merely manifest the existing power disparities such that they are tools
and exemplars of the disparities in power? And what is the impact when
power disparities and the exercise of power by the powerful shut out the
smaller states from legitimate trade? Jamaica, and the Caribbean in general,
appears to illustrate the assumption of the reins of state power by illicit
transborder networks.
In those cases, the fiction of the juridical equality of states becomes,
itself, a source of comparative advantage for the pursuit of illicit and illegal
activities. That is, as the illegal and illicit take over the economy, the state's
sovereign status becomes a shield against scrutiny and the implementation
of an internationally-based rule of law.
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A further question arises whether the pooling of sovereignty continues to
be a good choice. Membership of multilateral organizations may hold out
the benefits of access to previously negotiated bargains and voice within an
organization, even if the strength and influence of that voice is hindered by
the reality of limited resources. However, decentralization and a refusal to
join and to pool sovereignty may facilitate heterogeneity-that is, by
serving to limit the spread and implementation of economic theories and
projects that enjoy core/fundamental support in the West, but which may
not serve the interests of smaller, weaker, more peripheral regions and
economies.
